

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 26, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR: RADM R.W. Schmitt
Chairman
Caribbean Basin Intelligence Working Group

SUBJECT: Contadora Verification Monitoring Tasks

31 DEC 1984
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I appreciated the thoughtful and informative evaluation of present and projected intelligence capabilities done by the sub-group of the CBIWG on Contadora verification monitoring tasks. Both Ambassador Shlaudeman and I found it most useful. State would like for work to continue, with focus on how verification capabilities can be maintained or upgraded where necessary.

We have supplementary questions, some of which I raised at the Steering Group meeting on December 11.

--A key question for purposes of Contadora and regional negotiations is the minimum numbers of civilian and military personnel required to operate each of the Central American-based systems.

--Can the current numbers be reduced?

--Can, for example, the number of personnel at Cerro La Mole be reduced to the same extent that Tigre Island's presence will be reduced when remoting commences?

--How can the installations to which we have access can be given a more Honduran character without affecting our control and intelligence assets?

--As we develop more information about the possible powers and authority of a Contadora Commission for Verification and Control (CVC), we will be asking you to evaluate what capability that mechanism would provide. If for example, an ally such as Canada were to take part in the CVC, how would you assess the effectiveness of our combined capabilities?

--I brought up the question of what aerial photo capability the CVC might have. I would be interested in the CBIWG's opinion of this option in the abstract, as well as thoughts on what systems might be available to the CVC.

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
--I understood from the meeting that if we could arrange display points for a viewed dismantling/destruction procedure, this would affect your evaluation regarding our capability to confirm that limited weapons systems that have been replaced are removed or dismantled. What are the specific guidelines with regard to these procedures that we need to know to help develop sound verification procedures?

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--Should there be, as we discussed after the meeting, an effort to put together on an annual basis a rough estimate of the costs necessary to run an adequate surveillance/verification program for a Contadora agreement?

Once again, many thanks to all concerned for the fine work so far on this project.

Warm Regards,



Frank McNeil

cc:
cc: Ambassador Shlaudeman
cc: ARA - Craig Johnstone

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